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Circumventing ‘free care’ and ‘shouting
louder’: using a health systems approach to
study eye health system sustainability in
government and mission facilities of
north-west Tanzania
Jennifer J. Palmer1,2, Alice Gilbert3, Michelle Choy4 and Karl Blanchet5*
Abstract
Background: Little is known about the contributions of faith-based organisations (FBOs) to health systems in Africa.
In the specialist area of eye health, international and domestic Christian FBOs have been important contributors as
service providers and donors, but they are also commonly critiqued as having developed eye health systems
parallel to government structures which are unsustainable.
Methods: In this study, we use a health systems approach (quarterly interviews, a participatory sustainability
analysis exercise and a social network analysis) to describe the strategies used by eye care practitioners in four
hospitals of north-west Tanzania to navigate the government, church mission and donor rules that govern eye
services delivery there.
Results: Practitioners in this region felt eye care was systemically neglected by government and therefore was
‘all under the NGOs’, but support from international donors was also precarious. Practitioners therefore adopted
four main strategies to improve the sustainability of their services: (1) maintain ‘sustainability funds’ to retain
financial autonomy over income; (2) avoid granting government user fee exemptions to elderly patients who are
the majority of service users; (3) expand or contract outreach services as financial circumstances change; and (4)
access peer support for problem-solving and advocacy. Mission-based eye teams had greater freedom to increase
their income from user fees by not implementing government policies for ‘free care’. Teams in all hospitals,
however, found similar strategies to manage their programmes even when their management structures were
unique, suggesting the importance of informal rules shared through a peer network in governing eye care in this
pluralistic health system.
Conclusions: Health systems research can generate new evidence on the social dynamics that cross public and
private sectors within a local health system. In this area of Tanzania, Christian FBOs’ investments are important,
not only in terms of the population health outcomes achieved by teams they support, but also in the diversity of
organisational models they contribute to in the wider eye health system, which facilitates innovation.
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Background
Christian missionaries and faith-based organisations (FBOs)
have long played a prominent role in health systems in
Africa. During the colonial period, Christian missions were
the cornerstone for the promotion of Western-style health,
education and wealth. Today, they derive much of their le-
gitimacy as organisations capable of reaching the ‘grass
roots’ with their continued relevance attributed to the
failures of the African State to deliver services and engage
holistically with poor peoples’ needs [1]. This contribution
is widely acknowledged in high-level global health policy
dialogue and practice, for example, through the awarding of
large development grants to Christian FBOs by major do-
nors [2]. Such FBOs may deliver services themselves and/or
coordinate aid to the health programmes of local church
congregations which run health facilities. However, sur-
prisingly little is known about the comparative benefits,
harms and contributions of faith-based, non-state actors
alongside government providers in achieving the basics of
universal health coverage (health system reach to poor
people, cost to patients and satisfaction of patients with
services) or the sustainable health system governance that
supports this [2–5].
Reproductive and sexual health problems (e.g. HIV/AIDS,
contraception) have provided rich terrain for other scholars
investigating the influence of Christian FBOs and churches
on African development because of assumed tensions be-
tween religion and the linked concepts of development/
modernity/liberalism [1]. Initially, church organisations
tended to deny HIV or condemn HIV responses; but as
HIV grew into a large-scale social and moral crisis, partici-
pation in mainstream international health responses be-
came a way for many Church organisations in Africa to
confront the social stigma and structural inequalities that
shape the epidemic and was an overtly religious and politi-
cal act [6]. Today, the political economy of HIV engage-
ment can be as beneficial to Christian FBOs and churches
(such as for organisational survival) as to a Church’s parish-
ioners and patients [7]. Blindness, on the other hand, has
commonly been an attractive and noble health pursuit for
religious charities in Africa, but little is known about what
eye health does ‘for’ Christian FBOs, churches and the
health systems they are a part of. In this paper, we argue
that a very narrow and specialist health concern – eye
care – provides an interesting alternative case study of the
role of faith-based providers in African development be-
cause of the relative invisibility of this problem to the State.
As with other health problems, early eye care work in
many parts of Africa (Ghana (1930s), Nigeria (1940s–50s),
Tanzania, Uganda and Malawi (1960s), for example), was
performed by missionary physicians [8]. Although secular
international and African non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) probably dominate eye care development work
on the continent today, Christian faith continues to motiv-
ate several large eye health development actors as symbo-
lised by the Vatican’s role as host of a 2012 meeting to
discuss the future of international eye health [9, 10].
One in seven eye care practitioners in sub-Sahara Africa
(19% of eye surgeons) work in a facility run by NGOs (in-
cluding Christian FBOs) [11]. NGOs and FBOs also often
provide the bulk of funding, equipment and consumables in
national eye care programmes [12–16], with positive effects
on the productivity of eye health workers [16]. Eye care
NGOs and FBOs work in ways that may be judged more or
less sustainable, ranging from decades-long programmatic
support for specific hospitals to short-term expatriate-led
missions to distribute recycled spectacles [17–19].
A consistent critique has emerged over the last decade,
however, which charges NGOs and FBOs with having de-
veloped eye health systems parallel to government struc-
tures that must be maintained through continuous
external financing, leaving eye health as a neglected area of
development by African governments [10, 16, 20–22].
Opinion leaders have therefore called for a “paradigm shift”
[20] (p. 4) in the way eye care NGOs/FBOs work, calling
for closer and better coordination at sub-regional and
country levels. In particular, the International Agency for
the Prevention of Blindness and the WHO-led VISION
2020 campaign encourage national eye health coordinators
within Ministries of Health and NGOs/FBOs to advocate
for greater, long-term domestic support to eye care and
better integration of NGO/FBO eye care services into na-
tional health systems [23–25]. From the perspective of
NGOs/FBOs, following the VISION 2020 approach appears
to require a shift in programming emphasis. If “service
delivery alone will not bring about systematic change” [26]
(p. 70), then NGOs/FBOs must begin to engage with
“society and systems” [10] (p. 74). Additionally, while many
NGOs/FBOs seek to keep a hand in direct service delivery
(either to maintain financial contributions from private
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donor bases or to maintain credibility in advocacy work
[10, 26]), for others, this policy position inevitably means a
reduction in support to this type of on-the-ground work or
to specific components of it such as outreach activities.
With some exceptions [15, 27], scant literature has ex-
plored how eye health personnel define and work to-
wards sustainability in this context, across the parallel
NGO/FBO and government systems that VISION 2020
seeks to bring together. A health policy and systems ap-
proach has been suggested by scholars to interrogate the
complicated relationships between religion, public health
and development [2, 28]. In this study, we use a health
systems approach to describe the strategies used by eye
care practitioners in four hospitals of north-west
Tanzania to navigate the government, mission, FBO and
donor rules that govern eye services delivery here. We
furthermore seek to understand the entry and potential
contribution of a new pan-sectoral and informal eye
care practitioners’ network, the Lake Region Eye Care
Services Association (LARESA).
Before a note on methodology, we review literature on
the policy context of government, Christian faith-based
and secular NGO engagement in eye health in Tanzania,
and define our study setting more specifically. We then
examine how practitioners characterise service delivery
in each sector and analyse service output in relation to
observed models of financing, service diversification and
use of social capital. We end by suggesting how actors in
Tanzania can better conceptualise and contribute to eye
health system sustainability to achieve equitable develop-
ment across the sectors.
Eye health development in Tanzania
Christian missionaries from Germany, Britain, Sweden
and other European countries were responsible for much
of the earliest modern health infrastructure in inland,
rural Tanzania [29]. The first cataract surgeries were
probably carried out at Mvumi mission hospital in the
1930s by general surgeons (Allen Foster, personal com-
munication) and this was also the first hospital in the
country to employ an ophthalmologist in the 1960s [8].
By the time of independence in 1961, Christian mission-
ary societies owned 42% of all hospital beds in the coun-
try and 81% of the primary healthcare facilities [30].
Following an ‘African socialist’ approach to develop-
ment, President Nyerere nationalised many mission health
facilities beginning in the late 1960s [30, 31]. As a lead-
ing advocate of the WHO 1978 Alma Ata declaration,
Tanzania later took steps to divert resources from hos-
pitals into front-line facilities [31]. This broad approach
may have indirectly supported community eye care ser-
vices, through local government recognition of the eye
health needs of elderly people for spectacles in high-
profile adult literacy campaigns [32, 33]. Financial
contributions to fund spectacle donations, for example,
were encouraged from local groups in the spirit of self-
reliance [32].
During this period, specialist services, such as eye care,
created important symbolic justification for retaining
mission actors in the health system. In the early 1970s,
Nyerere commissioned Church missions, supported by
international FBOs, to build regional teaching and refer-
ral hospitals to house specialist services [29]. These in-
stitutions were responsible for training the country’s first
non-physician assistant medical officers in ophthalmol-
ogy (AMOOs), ophthalmologists and optometrists be-
tween 1975 and 1985 (Nkundwe Mwakyusa and Allen
Foster, 2012, personal communications). With the global
economic crisis and the imposition of World Bank struc-
tural adjustment programmes in the 1980s, many ser-
vices at government-run district and referral hospitals
became run-down [29, 31]. This created political space
for domestic Church missions to retake ownership of
key hospitals in the country [30, 31, 34] and reinvigo-
rated FBO, NGO and donor interest in specialist hos-
pital services, including eye care [35].
Healthcare in Tanzania was further reformed in the
1990s through a process of decentralisation and the
adoption of patient user fees and insurance mechanisms
[36–38]. Development funding was reorganised into a
more flexible sector-wide approach, allowing the Ministry
of Health and Social Welfare access to greater resources to
develop the hospital system and re-engage government–
voluntary sector partnership models. High-performing hos-
pitals, regardless of the sector they are in, may now apply
for additional government funding as district designated
hospitals. If it is an NGO or Church-run facility, it be-
comes co-managed by district government structures and
has access to central government funds for staff salaries
and district ‘basket’ funds for medical supplies and infra-
structure [36]. This normally represents a financial oppor-
tunity for many Church-owned facilities which, in recent
years, have seen a decrease in direct donor funding due to
the sector-wide approach or other causes [30]. At least
nine international eye care NGOs or Christian FBOs
operate in Tanzania today [39].
Methods
Setting and selection of study sites
The ‘Lake Region’1 of north-west Tanzania, where this
study was conducted, has far fewer human resources for
eye health and performs less cataract surgeries than rec-
ommended for sub-Saharan Africa (0.2 ophthalmologists
per million population compared to a target of 4.0; 6.1
mid-level personnel including AMOOs and nurses com-
pared to the 10.0 target; 1.4 optometrists compared to a
20.0 target; data collected from districts by study team, see
also [11]). At the time of this study, the Lake Region was
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populated by more than 10 million people but had only
one surgically-active ophthalmologist. Non-physician
AMOOs and cataract surgeons (AMOOs with an extra
year of training in cataract and other minor eye surgeries)
therefore lead development of the sector here, delivering
the most complex eye health interventions in the area.
Six out of 11 cataract surgeons/AMOOs were based in
mission-owned facilities. There were 11 hospitals owned
by church missions in the Lake Region (including Lutheran,
Catholic and Africa Inland Church denominations), com-
pared to 29 fully government-run facilities and around 15
private for-profit hospitals or practices.
We purposively selected four cataract surgeons and their
teams from four different regions to follow prospectively
based on geographic accessibility for the study team and
sector of employment: two from the government sector
(Government Hospitals A and B) and two from the mission
sector (Mission Hospitals A and B). Government Hospital
B received additional support from a secular international
eye health NGO. Mission Hospital A was a district desig-
nated hospital and was co-owned by the government.
Those from the mission sector were supported by the
funder of this study, an international faith-based organisa-
tion, Christoffel-Blindenmission (CBM), which has been
supporting eye health services in Tanzania since 1973. We
also followed regional developments in eye care through
study of an eye care practitioner’s organisation which all
surgeons in the study were members of, LARESA.
The private for-profit sector is relatively small in the
Lake Region but slowly growing in terms of ophthalmo-
logic services (such as cataract surgery) in Tanzania, and
is the main provider of optometric services, but we did
not have space to explore private practice dynamics here.
Field work
Field work consisted of four quarterly field visits to the
Lake Region lasting 2–5 weeks each over a 1 year period
(September 2012 to August 2013). Data was collected by
a team of four expatriate researchers who contributed
information to a central database, with one (JP) collecting
data from all case study hospitals, two (AG and MC)
spending extended periods in two case study hospitals
each, and another (KB) focusing on study of LARESA and
the sustainability analysis workshop. Data collection was
prioritised in the four case study hospitals but also oc-
curred opportunistically in six others to further con-
textualise our analysis across all LARESA areas.
On each visit, qualitative data was collected through
in-depth interviews with staff from eye departments,
hospital management teams, mission health programmes,
and district and regional medical offices. Interviews were
audio-recorded and followed a loose topic guide that ad-
dressed the following issues: the history and future plans
of the eye programme at each hospital; emergent events,
relationships between actors of the health system, man-
agement decisions, and associated rationale affecting eye
care in the last quarter; and local perceptions of eye health
system sustainability. Interview data was supplemented
with field notes from informal discussions during observa-
tions of eye care activities and review of documents re-
lating to eye care activities in the hospital.
Each quarterly field visit additionally pursued a specific
complementary data collection objective: (1) a mapping
exercise to identify all eye care human resources and
programmes in the Lake Region; (2) a participatory sus-
tainability analysis exercise conducted with LARESA
members, individuals involved in government and NGO
eye health system planning, and patient representatives,
to choose indicators of eye health system sustainability in
the Region and obtain measures in the case study hospi-
tals (process adapted from [40, 41]; see [42] for details on
methods, indicators selected and baseline measurements);
(3) a social network analysis to identify the range and
types of actors who support eye care at each case study
hospital and in which domain (e.g. reporting, outreach,
equipment procurement, human resources recruitment,
advocacy, etc., using methods described in [43]); and (4)
close observation of decision-making surrounding the
planning of outreach activities. Study of LARESA also in-
volved interviews with members and the chairperson, ob-
servation of one meeting, and review of meeting minutes
and other documents since its establishment.
All notes, transcripts, documents and other research
products were imported into a central NVivo qualitative
analysis database and coded line-by-line to understand
broad eye health sustainability narratives in the Lake Re-
gion. All information collected on individual case studies
was assembled to understand the evolution of three
main types of activities which emerged in discussions
and tended to dominate enquiries on sustainability in
each hospital: departmental financing, how services be-
came diversified, and how information was shared
among peers. After this internal process was completed
for each case study, experiences were compared across
hospitals and any differences by sector (mission vs. gov-
ernment) were identified and further explored [44]. Fi-
nally, by analysing theoretical eye health sustainability
narratives alongside our observations of the processes of
change pursued by eye departments in practice, we were
able to identify four thematic ‘sustainability strategies’,
which explained the most important ways in which eye
care actors work to achieve sustainability in the Lake
Region eye health system.
Results
Eye care: a ‘blind spot’ for government
Eye health sustainability was most commonly perceived
by actors in the Lake Region as constrained by systemic
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government neglect. At the sustainability workshop,
each national- and regional-level actor who was asked to
contribute information for a contextual overview of the
eye care system emphasised low government prioritisa-
tion of funds for eye health as a reason why eye health
human resources, infrastructure, equipment and activi-
ties were deficient in hospitals [42]. These deficiencies
subsequently compromised implementation of Tanzania’s
domestic eye health strategies. Partly, this was seen as a
problem of global and therefore domestic health priorities:
by not directly causing mortality, vision loss could not
compete with interventions for maternal-child health and
HIV prioritised by the Millennium Development Goals,
which play a key role in framing the health strategy in
Tanzania.
At regional level, while regional eye care coordinator
positions existed, actors pointed to their typical exclu-
sion from formal regional health management teams.
Consequently, local advocacy efforts aimed at these
structures by eye care practitioners themselves were
considered ineffective (data obtained from a sustainability
workshop presentation by LARESA chairperson).
Absence of basic eye care commodities in national
supply systems was also strongly symbolic of neglect in
this system for eye care actors; one cataract surgeon de-
scribed being able to buy such items from the national
medical store rather than from more expensive private
sources, as a “dream” (interviews with eye care practi-
tioners (ECPs) in Mission Hospital B and Government
Hospital A). The ambivalent procurement strategy in the
current national eye care plan, whereby closer links to
the national medical store would be sought alongside de-
velopment of new processes to purchase outside of it,
also perhaps highlights the plan’s authors’ mistrust of
wider government willingness to prioritise eye care [45].
A common saying among eye care practitioners there-
fore was, “the government has a blind spot on eye ser-
vices” (ECP in non-case study hospital).
At the hospital level, general managers themselves ad-
mitted they often forgot about the equipment needs of
this specialty service because they had little exposure to
eye health in medical training. Furthermore, practi-
tioners felt there was little public appetite to address eye
health needs: “If the maternal mortality rate goes up, the
politicians will come here and ask why. But if many pa-
tients become blind nobody will care” (ECP, Government
Hospital A).
Eye care: ‘All under the NGOs’
Given the relative lack of engagement by government in
eye care in Tanzania, key national-level eye health system
actors therefore characterised eye care as “all under the
NGOs” (presentation by national eye care programme rep-
resentative), and a sector in which donor assistance would
always be required (interview with eye health donor).
Throughout the study period, donors were an obvious re-
source to whom cataract surgeons were consistently re-
ferred when seeking funding for routine eye care activities
from hospital, district, regional and even national manage-
ment teams. Donor support was also seen as the only way
eye services could ever be provided free to patients (ECPs,
Government Hospital A and B). However, eye care
actors also saw NGO funding as inherently precar-
ious. For instance, in all annual reports written by
CBM-funded eye departments to hospital manage-
ment during the study period, surgeons highlighted
the challenge of working when donor funds were
“late and insufficient” (Mission Hospital A Annual
Report 2012); workshop attendees therefore selected two
indicators related to this topic to measure process towards
system sustainability (Additional file 1) [42].
A sectoral divide?
Analysis of key population outcomes in the case study
hospitals painted a mixed picture of programme per-
formance across the government and mission sectors.
In terms of the total number of eye patients examined
by teams in 2012 (Table 1), no clear association could be
identified with the hospital sector that eye care teams
worked in.2 On the other hand, the number of eye sur-
geries that teams performed may have been associated
with the sector, since both mission hospitals performed
more surgeries than both government hospitals (969 and
985 vs. 0 and 605, respectively, considering those con-
ducted both at the facility and by outreach). The govern-
ment hospital with external eye care donor funding also
notably performed more surgeries than the government
hospital with none.
Table 1 Key population health outcomes by case study hospital
in 2012
Government A Government B Mission A Mission B
Number of eye patients examined by team
At base 2599 5020 7180 1720
Via outreach 0 4682 12,502 161
Total 2599 9702 19,682 1881
Number of cataract surgeries performed by team
At base 0 605 498 955
Via outreach 0 0 471 30
Total 0 605 969 985
Number of cataract surgeries performed by other surgical teams in
hospital’s region
Total 334 0 254 0
Regional CSR
All teams 146 347 441 642
CSR cataract surgical rate, per million population, using 2012 population data
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The remaining sections of this paper will seek to
explore the dynamic factors that contributed to the de-
livery of these key eye care services, paying particular
attention to the strategies teams undertook to improve
or maintain their sustainability. Four main strategies
are discussed.
Sustainability strategy 1: maintain ‘sustainability funds’
Apart from the government and donor revenue sources
mentioned in dominant sustainability narratives, patient
fees also offered an important stream of revenue to hos-
pital eye departments and were accounted for in com-
plex ways in eye care actors’ considerations of system
sustainability.
In the short term, eye care actors saw collection of
user fees as the most practical way to overcome financial
deficiencies in government structures and dependency
on NGOs to achieve sustainability. When patient fees
were collected and/or managed by ECPs themselves, this
type of income was “easy to get”, it was reliable given the
greater demand for services than supply could provide
and, through short-term forecasting, practitioners could
tell from patient numbers when they would “need to
pull up [their] stockings” to bring in more patients and
therefore revenue through outreach (ECP at Mission
Hospital B). Furthermore, this type of income could be
used very flexibly. Access to this type of income nor-
mally translated into greater autonomy for eye teams as
they did not need to seek permission from actors out-
side the eye team, such as hospital managers or donors,
for regular purchases or for those that required quick
decisions. Income from user fees could also be used to
purchase drugs outside the national medical store –
something which could not easily be done with money
coming through typical government sources dedicated
to purchasing in federal systems. During the indicator
measurement exercise, when the team from one gov-
ernment hospital calculated the proportion of the eye
department budget which came from patient fees at
36%, they were disappointed, seeing this as unsustain-
able; 70% was their ideal so that they would not have to
depend on the government.
Income from patient fees was also commonly referred
to using a meaningful colloquial name by eye care ac-
tors: the ‘sustainability fund’. It was a reserve fund that
teams could build up slowly and protect, since, “every
fund generated in the hospital, has to go to the common
pool, right? From the common pool, the management
committee of the hospital decides oh we need this and we
need this and then there is no money, there are no funds
[left] for eyes” (ECP at non-case study hospital).
Additionally, with a small, departmentally-controlled
fund, this could help eye teams demonstrate to others
(e.g. hospital management, local government or donors)
that they wanted to “progress” or build their unit’s sus-
tainability, indirectly encouraging external actors to
“pitch in” (ibid).
In 2012, three out of the four eye departments we
studied had ‘sustainability funds’. Government Hospital
A did not, and relied entirely on the hospital to provide
income for consumables and any other purchases they
needed (Fig. 1). As all other teams received donor fund-
ing, it is possible that the verticality of donor accounting
processes helped initiation of separately-controlled eye
accounts in these hospitals. In both Government Hos-
pital B and Mission Hospital A, a portion of patient fees
revenue was given to the hospital to enable central pur-
chases, but the eye department eventually received the
value back in-kind through some consumables and ac-
cess to hospital infrastructure. In the mission sector,
teams had more financial independence; Mission
Hospital A staff, for example, rarely had to negotiate
permission to use funds for outreach activities or profes-
sional development expenses such as attendance at zonal
or international meetings.
Mission Hospital B eye department’s income was the
most partitioned. While it was required to contribute
some income to the Church, it had recently opened a
separate eye service-only fee collection window from the
hospital’s and stopped contributing to the hospital’s cen-
tral budget. From the perspective of the eye care unit,
this was a protective measure since the hospital was near
bankruptcy and, with the precariousness of eye care
donor funding, patient fees were increasingly their largest
source of income. Managed independently from the rest
of the hospital, this system ensured that all eye patients
paid before receiving treatment and funds were available
immediately to pay for consumables, salaries and other
service delivery costs. Mission Hospital B was a rare ex-
ample of a department within a hospital that had the fi-
nancial capacity to pay its staff salaries every month.
Over the study period, the eye team in Government
Hospital A came to the conclusion that they needed to
develop a sustainability fund, like in other successful eye
hospitals they had observed in Tanzania. A 2013 visit by
the eye team to Mission Hospital B was particularly in-
fluential. In the Government Hospital A team’s words,
although Mission hospital B received less donor support
now, larger amounts from CBM historically had helped
them become “a well-established unit. They were getting
a good support before, then after they matured, they
started to move themselves […] now they are managing
themselves from patient fees. It is working”. They judged
that, as a government facility, they could not set-up their
own fee collection window for the department. However,
after this visit they became more systematic about ensur-
ing patients had paid their fees, before administering
treatment. This allowed them to independently track the
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eye unit income, collecting information on a ‘virtual’ sus-
tainability fund, which they planned to use in future ne-
gotiations with hospital managers to demonstrate the
(monetary) value of their service and therefore advocate
for more hospital funds being spent in the eye department.
The circumstance differed in each case study, but ul-
timately the creation of this parallel financing system
(where rules of collection, pooling and purchasing were
solely determined by the eye care team in response to
their specific needs) was a resourceful way for local ac-
tors to put into place new systems where the official
government-donor partnership system had failed.
Sustainability strategy 2: avoid exemptions
At the same time as many eye departments were working
towards increasing their income from patient fees, how-
ever, practitioners concomitantly feared an over-reliance
on patient fee collection if this came to be perceived by
the population to be in contradiction with existing govern-
ment poverty-reduction policies.
Although free healthcare was introduced to govern-
ment facilities at Independence, severe budget deficits
eventually led Tanzania to reinstate user fees in 1993 for
all but a few categories of patients [46]. Given difficulties
verifying age, carrying out economic means tests and
shifting political narratives about the contribution of
older people to national development, over-60s were also
granted universal exemptions for healthcare a decade
later [47–49]. This policy is particularly relevant to eye
health services, since vision declines rapidly with age
and users are mainly older people: globally, 82% of blind
and 65% of visually-impaired people are over the age of
50 [50]. With no clear mechanism in place to account
for or reimburse these exemptions, however, eye care
practitioners widely saw this policy as practically prob-
lematic, commonly posing the question: “We don’t see
any compensation from the government […] Who is going
to pay for them?” (ECP at Mission Hospital A). Rather,
adoption of this policy was mainly seen as a populist
issue, used to appeal to voters across the political
spectrum in Tanzania using “sweet words” (ECP at
Government Hospital B) but with few provisions for
implementation: “In theory the government says that
they will pay for those people but when we go to the
higher management, the district team says that they
have no budget for that, […] so it is remaining an
exemption forever […] it is merely political, nowhere
can you stand and say, you government, you say from
this policy. The government is leaving us in an uncer-
tain position.” (ECP at non-case study hospital).
For some, this reality meant that the policy was not
implementable, and paradoxically, again contributed to
the overall government neglect of eye health at the
policy level. As one practitioner put it, “ours [eye disease]
is a condition which is not involved in free care” (ECP at
Government Hospital A). Others, however, justified skirting
this policy using sectoral arguments. Whereas practi-
tioners in the government sector, if discovered, were at
Fig. 1 Schematic of revenue streams available to eye departments in case study hospitals in 2012
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risk of public shaming in the media, mission sector
hospitals, even district-designated ones, could claim
parastatal status to explain their fee structure. However,
moral justifications could be found for government
hospitals too, since systemic government deficiencies
made it difficult to implement any policy affecting eye
care, such as the minimum human resources and
equipment needed to deliver eye services: “They [gov-
ernment] speak well but don’t put into practice […]
what they write in policies, for example ensuring
government hospitals have drugs, equipment and even
simple things. This is why you find that mission hospi-
tals have more patients than government hospitals”
(ECP at non-case study hospital). In practice, however,
when challenged by patients, practitioners tended to justify
their behaviour by explaining the financial deficit in their
hospital and, under these circumstances, claiming relative
modesty in their own pricing structure: “Whereas in other
places you would have to pay 100,000 plus eye drops, our
rate is 40,000. If you pay 40,000 you will not be requested
to pay for anything else” (ECP, Government Hospital B).
In our study, we found no evidence that exemptions
were routinely made for elderly eye care patients in any
hospital in the Lake Region, including those with govern-
ment health insurance at mission hospitals, since it took
the hospital so long to be reimbursed. An exception was
the multi-region outreach held on World Sight Day, which
received separate donor funding and targeted ‘difficult
to reach’ patients. Additionally, Government Hospital B
started offering many more exemptions in the final
month of study at the request of the hospital’s medical
officer, who had received a personal visit from the
Minister of Health. Furthermore, there appeared to be
little collective appetite to address this complex prob-
lem transparently at LARESA meetings, despite recog-
nition of its special importance to the eye care sector: a
tentative proposal at one LARESA meeting to brain-
storm solutions so that practitioners would not have to
“go against the law” was shelved for future discussion
(observation of LARESA meeting).
Ineffective implementation of exemption policies
elsewhere in Tanzania has been previously explained by
confusion about eligibility criteria as well as fear of jeo-
pardising district funds’ financial viability [49]. Patient
fees were the main source of income in the Lake Region
case study hospitals (Table 2), which a universal exemption
policy for the elderly would have put at substantial risk,
threatening eye departments’ organisational viability. In
fact, despite the prominence in eye health sustainability
narratives of the concept of NGO relationships determining
service performance, income from patient fees exceeded
that from donors in each study hospital (Table 2). Addition-
ally, since eye donors accounted for government contribu-
tions (and therefore sector ‘location’) in estimations of their
annual disbursements, when income from both sectors was
combined, eye departments with any donor actually re-
ceived approximately similar amounts (TZS 28–32 million).
The major differences in income generated overall were in-
stead associated with the amounts departments accrued
through patient fees (especially fees for surgeries).
Income from patient fees, however, was very dependent
on the sector eye teams operated in. There was large vari-
ation in the amounts patients were charged for cataract
surgeries across the study hospitals (ranging from TZS
40,000 to TZS 150,000; Table 2). Most actors interviewed
could not name the exact amount charged by other facil-
ities but knew generally that fees tended to be higher in
the mission sector than the government, where fees are
capped by law. Unlike practices used in response to ex-
emptions policies, government hospitals were hesitant to
avoid implementation and inflate fees. While surgical pa-
tient fees in mission facilities were around twice as high as
those in the government sector at the beginning of 2012,
by the end of the year, they were three times as much, po-
tentially highlighting the greater autonomy of eye units in
the mission sector to respond to economic threats
affecting the sustainability of their services.
Therefore, contrary to actors’ outward impressions of
sustainability in the Lake Region eye health system, eye
departments in the mission sector appeared not to be fi-
nancially better off because of their privileged access to
donor financing (although this was a contribution), they
were better off mainly because they had direct control
(collection and management) of a revenue stream: pa-
tient fees, which contributed to a ‘sustainability fund’.
Sustainability strategy 3: expand and contract services
Practitioners saw outreach as a necessary means to im-
proving population eye health outcomes either by bring-
ing surgical services closer to patients in remote areas
(surgical outreach) or by screening and referring patients
to services at central locations (clinical outreach). Both
types of outreach helped sensitise communities to eye
diseases and eye service availability, which generated de-
mand for services, thereby promoting sustainability.
In 2012, there were some sectoral differences in the
range of services available in eye departments (Table 3).
Examinations and surgeries were both routinely offered
at base facilities and via outreach by mission hospitals.
In the government hospitals, surgical outreach services
in particular were more limited. By the end of the study
period, however, the government hospitals had taken
promising steps to expand the types of services they of-
fered, whereas services had contracted in one mission
hospital (Box 1). Partly, this related to the ways eye
teams individually viewed outreach in the trade-off
between today’s needs and future sustainability, namely as
too expensive (Mission Hospital B), as a risk to equipment
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(Government Hospital B) or as an opportunity for co-
funding (Government and Mission Hospitals A).
The experiences of three hospitals highlighted the
unpredictability of donor funds for service expansion.
Donors had made particular commitments which could
only sometimes be adjusted or re-committed to other
hospitals within the local eye health system as circum-
stances changed. Local governments, likewise, could only
sometimes be cajoled into co-funding outreach.
In contrast, individual eye departments uniformly
demonstrated flexibility and personal resourcefulness in
response to changes in funding structures, even in long-
running programmes. For example, Mission Hospital A
had developed strategies to extract commitments for
outreach funding from several local authorities in their
region and income from both donors and patients con-
tributed to their ability to change their activities quickly
when even small amounts of government funding be-
came available. The willingness of the Government
Hospital A team to use personal income to pay the
transportation costs for donated equipment, even before
they had initiated their virtual ‘sustainability fund’, demon-
strated an understanding that personal initiatives, in par-
ticular, were necessary to run an eye unit in this kind of
health system structure, no matter the sector.
Sustainability strategy 4: access peer support to
‘shout louder’
Eye care human resources in the Lake Region in 2012 were
insufficient, but they were even scarcer in the 1990s. Then,
there were only two cataract surgeons to serve the region,
both supported by CBM (presentation by LARESA).
Although they covered large distances, no one seemed to
‘know’ about cataract surgery services – not communities,
not authorities, not hospitals, nor most other health
workers. Eventually, through discussions with non-surgical
eye care staff they met during their extensive outreach
work, these surgeons realised that everyone, regardless of
the sector they worked in, felt isolated, that “every indi-
vidual was just working independently” (ibid) so they
decided to create a network to bring everyone together.
They reasoned, “if we can organise ourselves, we can shout
louder” about the deprivation eye health suffered in their
region. The primary objective was then to speak with one
unified voice in order to attract more resources for eye
care. Further, if global and national strategy goals were
ever to be achieved in their area, Lake Region actors such
as themselves would first need “to collect all the problems,
analyse them and present them […] for help or attention”.
Their primary targets at this time were the Ministry of
Health and Social Welfare and CBM. These bodies,
Table 2 Sources of income and patient fees charged across eye departments by end of 2012
Government Aa Government Bb Mission A Mission Bc
Sources of income (TZS)
Governmentd Unknown 17,180,000 7,900,000 0
Eye health donors 0 15,200,000 20,000,000 30,900,000
Patient fees 0 18,480,000 21,700,000 118,800,000
Total Unknown 50,860,000 49,600,000 149,700,000
Patient fees charged for surgery 50,000 40,000 130,000 150,000
aFinancial contributions could not be estimated by the cataract surgeon who did not participate in financial planning for the eye department in 2012. Income
generation from eye surgeries began in 2013, so the 2013 patient fee value has been reported; patients also paid around TZS 4000 out of pocket on surgical
consumables they were asked to provide privately
bThis was the only hospital in the case study which sold spectacles (at TZS 20,000 per pair); this income has not been included in the analysis, for
comparative purposes
cDisbursement of donor funding in Mission Hospital B was severely delayed in 2012; in response, patient fees were increased that year from 80,000 to 150,000. In
Mission Hospital A, fees were also increased that year from 85,000 to 130,000 in response to rising hospital costs
dAn unknown, small proportion of income classified as ‘government’ comes from patient fees using general hospital services
TZS, Tanzanian Shilling
Table 3 Changes in availability of services in case study eye departments, 2012–2013
Services available Government A Government B Mission A Mission B
2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013
Examinations at facility Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Surgery at facility No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Examinations via outreach No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Surgery via outreach No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes, service was available; No, service was not available
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Box 1. Evolution of cataract surgery services in each case study hospital
Mission A: The only hospital in the Lake Region to have previously been staffed by two cataract surgeons, the 2012 eye team inherited a
very busy outreach schedule which they largely maintained during the study period, despite a halving in surgical capacity. The weekly
outreach schedule was diverse, including visits to a school for albino and blind students, a prison, a leprosy camp settlement, and most
hospitals in their own and surrounding regions. More surgeries were performed outside than inside their base hospital, either by
travelling with operating equipment to use in district hospitals’ theatres or by using additional equipment centrally stored at a regional
hospital lacking surgical ECPs. Patient fees charged at these clinical and surgical outreach visits were very flexible: while donor support
covered fuel, travel costs and a portion of the supplies, the team was sometimes able to offer services for free, such as at the prison,
when the Regional Medical Office agreed to help finance the activities, or at a subsidised rate in particular hospitals if the District
Medical Office showed willingness to contribute some support such as team per diems. Changes to the schedule were also sometimes
made to respond to and incentivise such local government contributions. The main factor constraining expansion appeared to be the
lack of staff able to run both outreach and services at the central facility. Mission B: In previous years, this eye team had performed
clinical and surgical outreach on a large scale with donor support, but a reduction in this funding combined with severe delays in the
2012 disbursement threatened the viability of their programme. The team therefore felt compelled to reduce their outreach activities to
concentrate on raising income through patient fees at the hospital. As one ECP stated, “if the CBM portion reduces, we simply reduce our
[outreach] activities”, since cash outlays are always needed in advance of these activities for fuel and per diems, in addition to the
consumables normally stocked for base-hospital surgeries. Only very limited clinical and surgical outreach activities were maintained that
year to honour agreements with two mission facilities which had received foreign donor funding for this purpose. The team could not,
however, perform surgical outreach when requested to replace surgeons unable to travel from another NGO, as the NGO would not
transfer funds for consumables and disagreed with the team charging patient fees to recoup this expense. The team instead organised a
clinical outreach and referred eligible patients to their base hospital for surgery. This was the only team that did not seek financial
contributions for outreach expansion from the local government.
Government B: Since 2005, the eye team had led outreach activities with external funding within one of the only official district-level
‘VISION 2020’ programmes in the country. By 2007, the number of surgeries performed annually began to plateau, at around 600.
Although substantial numbers of patients were examined, all outreach to district facilities was clinical. Surgical outreach in the region
had only been performed several years earlier by a visiting surgeon. In 2012, the team were reluctant to perform surgery during their
own outreaches for fear of further damaging their operating microscope which had not been serviced since the donation was originally
made and was in need of repair. It was not until after a 2012 LARESA meeting, when members discussed the importance of doing outreach,
that the team re-considered performing surgeries and requested supplemental funding to do so from their eye donor, who also agreed to
fund the microscope repair. Government A: In 2012, the hospital received a recently graduated cataract surgeon. Staffed until then by a
retired surgeon, no surgeries had been conducted there in the previous 4 years due to that surgeon’s own deteriorating vision. The new
surgeon had received his training in robust teaching hospital outreach programmes and so was disappointed on arrival when he found the
hospital’s operating equipment rusted and in disrepair. A frustrating 12-month period of conversations with the training school, the national
eye care programme and other donors ensued before a solution was found. The training school identified a donor for the equipment who
had unallocated equipment funding for government hospitals; the cataract surgeon himself would pay for the equipment transportation
costs, to be reimbursed later by the hospital. Sufficient consumables for 100 patients were also provided to seed the eye department’s
‘sustainability fund’ which could then be used to order more. Although the retired surgeon advised him to prioritise setting up a good service
at the hospital before starting to do outreach, the new surgeon saw outreach as an activity that could attract co-funding for donations of
consumables, transportation costs, even potentially equipment. Over this period he contacted eight types of actor about outreach or
equipment, including several District-level Eye Care Coordinators and medical offices. CBM was unwilling to reallocate funds dedicated to
another mission facility in the region which could not use them because this was a government hospital but funds from a different
government-donor agreement that could not proceed could be used. When another NGO could not operate in one area of the region, the
District Medical Office asked the new cataract surgeon to step-in, with additional financial support from their office, thereby adding limited
outreach activities to this team’s portfolio of eye care services in 2013.
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however, refused to work with such an organisation, whose
informal structure had little precedent in the country. From
CBM’s perspective, they were “not government, not mission,
not a professional organisation, not an NGO”, so for
accounting purposes it would be more efficient to work
through existing agreements with members’ mission hospi-
tals (interview with CBM). From the Ministry’s, LARESA
was accused of trying to separate Lake Region planning
from federal processes to compete for donor attention
(interview with LARESA chairperson). Its members demor-
alised, LARESA was disbanded for 12 years until a conver-
gence of factors prompted its re-establishment in 2008.
It now works with the national control programme and
donors to organise annual zonal-wide surgical camps, sen-
sitise regional governments to eye care needs, collect in-
formation on equipment and training needs, and advocate
for the fair distribution of these resources across facilities
(LARESA 5 year strategic plan 2012–2017). Through less
formal means, LARESA also seeks to counter professional
isolation by offering the experience of its members during
meetings as a technical resource to other members who
need help solving problems in their day-to-day work. Peer
coaching to solve problems and model alternative prac-
tices (for example, inspiration to track income for a future
sustainability fund in Government Hospital A or advice to
ask for microscope repair in Government Hospital B,
above) seemed to us to have a very practical influence on
adapting sustainability strategies in case studies during the
study period.
Stemming from the above philosophy and origins, an
important feature of this social network is its awareness
of the different ways eye care works through govern-
ment, mission and NGO structures as well as the shared
problems ECPs across sectors must grapple with because
of the systemic deficiencies of this long-standing partner-
ship model. This explains the oft-repeated idea by LARESA
members: “whether you are from public or mission sector,
we should all come together to work for the poor people of
this region. If you are an eye health provider, you are
automatically a member” (ECP at LARESA meeting).
Discussion
Neglect as opportunity: spaces for decision-making in a
decentralised system
Eye care, like other specialist hospital services in
Tanzania, developed unevenly in the 20th Century as a
result of wider health system structural changes. Today,
in the north-west Lake Region, the most complex eye
care activities are planned and performed by cataract
surgeons who are disproportionately employed in
mission-owned facilities. By the time of our study, re-
markably coherent narratives about eye health had de-
veloped among practitioners who described eye care as
‘all under the NGOs’ because of the systemic neglect
that eye care suffered by all levels of government. While
eye health may have been ‘political’ during Nyerere’s liter-
acy campaigns after Independence, by 2012, eye care prac-
titioners had become distrustful of government to engage
meaningfully in eye health development. This feeling of
neglect became more acute as practitioners discussed the
precariousness of support from international donors and
missions. Against this narrative backdrop, using innovative
health systems research methodologies, we explored how
eye teams worked towards sustainability in this context of
neglect, within a decentralised, plural health system.
While the official government eye health system in
Tanzania may be designed to be hierarchical (whereby
rules are made at the highest levels and passed down for
health workers to follow), other forms of governance typic-
ally emerge when hierarchical systems fail [51, 52]. In this
case (as elsewhere [25]), Church missions have provided an
important organised form of ‘co-governance’, but in this
study we have also highlighted the role that ‘self-govern-
ance’ plays when individual eye care units and the LARESA
network have the space to create their own rules [51].
With these overlapping modes of governance co-
existing in the same health system, the differences we
observed between our four case study eye departments
could not be completely explained by their position in a
particular mission or government sector. In fact, we ob-
served that teams in different hospitals found similar strat-
egies to manage the sustainability of their programme even
when their management structures or governance systems
were unique. As has been found elsewhere [53, 54] this sug-
gested to us that, within this weak, decentralised govern-
ment structure, the multiplicity of rules, which became
available to govern service delivery, meant that eye care
practitioners in the Lake Region had substantial decision
space within which to operate. The challenge for eye care
actors was to selectively draw from all governance systems
so that they benefitted eye care programmes without
jeopardising their activities. Four strategies, in particular,
pointed to systemic trends operating in this decision space
which should be accounted for when considering how best
to advance eye health sustainability in the Lake Region.
New rules to survive
Two sustainability strategies were related to eye programme
financing, namely maintenance of ‘sustainability funds’ and
avoidance of user fee exemptions. Sustainability funds,
or bank accounts which contained income from donors
and patient user fees, were kept by three of the four eye
departments to maintain financial autonomy from their
host hospitals. Mission-based departments tended to
have greater power over spending decisions and, having
observed a funding model which relied on such a fund
in the mission sector, by the end of the study period
the fourth eye team in the government sector had taken
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steps to begin their own independent fund. Contribu-
tions to this fund from patient income were seen as es-
sential to guarantee financial flexibility because they
were reliably and immediately available through delivery
of standard services; in all models, they also contributed
greater overall amounts than either donor or government
sources. All teams therefore sought to maximise income
from this source, by raising fees, by avoiding granting ex-
emptions or both. Teams operating from the mission sec-
tor, especially, had greater freedom to avoid government
policies that could have limited this strategy, but all teams
felt justified in doing so.
With little apparent government, mission or public
interest in the eye health service needs of elderly pa-
tients, eye care practitioners had neither the support to
implement government policies sustainably, nor did they
face opposition in decisions to skirt them. Eye care prac-
titioners are not alone in selectively implementing ex-
emptions in Tanzania because of weak government
capacity to monitor health regulations [49]. In many
low-income settings, in fact, informal rules or norms
supersede formal mechanisms when these mechanisms
are untenable, when there are no rules or when the rules
are vague [55, 56]. They are a way of solving important
problems such as a lack of basic drugs in hospitals [57]
or how to sustain financing for eye care services. Indeed,
some health systems research suggests that compliance
with upstream bureaucratic accountability mechanisms
can constrain local level innovation by front-line pro-
viders which may be needed to improve quality of care,
responsiveness and accountability to patients [58]. Seen
in this light, strategies to maintain sustainability funds
and avoid exemptions appear to be supply side innova-
tions that developed in the mission sector, were passed
on to others in government hospitals and became rou-
tine, local norms followed by LARESA members which
now act to morally ‘filter’ formal policies thereby influ-
encing implementation behaviour [56].
Contradictory financial considerations also underlay
the third sustainability strategy, namely to maintain
willingness to expand and contract services. As financial
circumstances worsened for one team, they elected to
contract outreach services in order not to detract from
higher-earning services at their base. This has probably
been the most common experience of outreach health
service provision funded by FBOs described in Tanzania
[59]. In contrast, two other departments saw outreach as
an opportunity to diversify their income. Both types of
experience illustrated an inherent characteristic of out-
reach that limits the ability of actors to adopt it as a new
activity or continue outreach after a ‘shock’ to the system
such as withdrawal of donor funding: its low ‘compatibil-
ity’ with existing health systems [15]. Since outreach re-
quires teams to work outside their typical place of work
and interact with external actors, conducting outreach
may not always be coherent with the perceived ‘man-
dates’ or expectations of other actors operating within
the same governance systems so significant modifica-
tions to actor roles may be required to solve new prob-
lems such as access to transportation and equipment
without donor support. In turn, accessing peer support
and other forms of social capital through the fourth sus-
tainability strategy was an important strategy to solve
problems such as teams’ desires to conduct outreach.
In the long term, coherence (rather than standardisa-
tion) between the various governance systems in the
Lake Region identified here will need to improve so that
survival strategies of eye care providers do not endanger
financial access of eye care services for populations.
Eye care providers as social entrepreneurs
A major problem characteristic of pluralistic systems
such as the Lake Region’s is that actors tend to work in
isolation [60]. Currently, key resources such as equip-
ment and donor contributions to outreach are parti-
tioned by sector. This has contributed to the diversity of
service delivery models we have already described, but it
also limits the sustainability of the entire system. With
little sharing of resources across the network, sustain-
ability can only be described as the sum of the sustain-
ability of each eye department within it, rather than a
single, robust system which benefits from synergism.
This is why the formation of LARESA, the informal peer
network which invites eye care practitioners, regardless of
cadre and sector, to address eye health system sustainabil-
ity through information gathering, experience sharing and
advocacy, is important. As a multi-sector network, LAR-
ESA can help write new informal rules, reform official
ones and establish beneficial norms by encouraging the
‘social entrepreneurs’ among its members (those who seek
to create social value or social justice) to mentor others,
for example [61–63]. That eye care providers in the Lake
Region innovate mainly as individuals rather than as
organisations should also be seen as beneficial. This con-
tributes to their ability to innovate as they are detached
from the constraints of traditional governance structures,
allowing them the freedom to operate and reach groups
that traditional governance models cannot [64, 65]. As
Christian FBOs in Tanzania have tended to avoid advocacy
which could be construed as political [66], the LARESA
network could therefore be a more effective organisation
to address controversial issues such as the over-60s
exemption policy. A social entrepreneurship model has
also been suggested by others in eye health to both spur
and provide technical oversight of commercial initiatives
to bring ready-made spectacles to rural areas in Africa
and Asia, and which ultimately contribute to poverty
alleviation [67].
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Conclusions
Can we say anything about the specific legacy of NGO,
FBO and mission sector engagement with eye care in this
part of Tanzania? What does Christian faith-based eye
health work do for FBOs, churches and health systems?
We used health systems research methodologies to track
social dynamics crossing the public and non-profit private
sectors to partially answer this question. Certainly, FBO
structures are important. All teams relied on donors for
access to equipment, and often this was through inter-
national mission structures, so mission-based eye care
departments were at an advantage. These donors also sup-
ported surgical running and other costs in some facilities;
this was critical in Mission Hospital B, the only eye de-
partment without access to any government resources for
eye care. The importance of donor contributions was also
highlighted in Government Hospital A, where services
were extremely limited in the first 12 months of operation
because of a lack of donor relationships. Ultimately, the
most productive team with the most diversified service
delivery (Mission Hospital A) drew financial and social
capital from both the mission and government sectors.
Although some eye care donors in Tanzania may be par-
ticularly inspired by their faith, we found no evidence to
suggest that eye health was particularly prioritised in local
mission hospitals in the Lake Region. Indeed, rather than
promoting local charity, either in-line with religious beliefs,
Nyerere’s historical declaration of self-reliance or with the
current government’s poverty-reduction provisions for
older persons, the particular Church running Mission
Hospital B itself actually received contributions from the
eye department which ultimately came from patients.
Like other areas of health in Tanzania, eye health devel-
opment has undoubtedly been held back by a legacy of de-
liberate under-funding by both government and Christian
mission sectors in an attempt to prompt the other to fill
that gap [59]. Can a mission health programme that ex-
tends access by charging triple the government-mandated
patient fee really be considered pro-poor, as Christian FBOs
typically purport to be [2]? However, as we have explained,
this gap also created an informal space for innovation
which benefits the current eye health system. By operating
from missions, teams are allowed greater freedom to avoid
implementing government policies which poorly address
implementation realities in a system of decentralised eye
services provision. Furthermore, these alternative ways of
delivering services serve as models for government hospi-
tals. An FBO like CBM’s investment is therefore positive
not only in terms of the population health outcomes
achieved by the surgical teams they have supported, but
also in terms of the organisational models its partners have
developed, which, through social networks such as LAR-
ESA, help to open practitioners’ eyes about what might be
possible through observation of diversity. Just as missions
originally invested in expatriate ophthalmologists in the
1970s to develop training programmes and eye care net-
works across the country, support to LARESA now offers
an innovative opportunity to invest in social entrepreneurs
dedicated to developing local eye care services and who,
importantly, cut across eye health sectors in Tanzania.
Looking to the future, we sound a final note of cau-
tion: while separating eye department procedures from
hospital systems and raising patient fees is an attractive
solution to management problems due to neglect in the
short term, in the long term, these strategies endanger
the sustainability of the whole system. Ultimately, pa-
tients will be the ones to pay for a less efficient system
and high user fees reduce population access and equity.
Expanding insurance programmes and increasing gov-
ernment investment in mission-owned facilities through
district-designated schemes may offer some resistance to
these negative trends.
The effects of neglect in eye health appear to be more
complex than we commonly realise, because, as the ex-
perience of practitioners in the Lake Region shows, neg-
lect generates new dynamics that affect sustainability in
unexpected ways.
Endnotes
1This ‘Lake Region’ name was defined for historical
reasons by eye care practitioners from this area them-
selves who sought to describe their organisation of eye
care practitioners as serving the four regions officially
recognised as encompassed by the ‘Lake Zone’: Kagera,
Mwanza, Musoma and Shinyanga, as well as three poorly-
served neighbouring regions that Lake Zone eye care
practitioners traditionally provided outreach to: Tabora
and parts of two new regions, Simiyu and Geita.
2The number of patient examinations was probably
explained by several factors, including the size of the catch-
ment population and patient demand for eye and/or gene-
ral health services at the hospital which have multiple
determinants not specifically explored in this study. For ex-
ample, while it might have been expected that the team at
Mission Hospital B would examine the fewest patients since
the hospital served the smallest catchment population,
Mission Hospital A’s catchment was smaller than the two
government regional hospitals but they examined the most.
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